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The Political Economy of Growth in China and India
Kalim Siddiqui *
Abstract
This paper attempts to examine the growth performance and its impact on inequality and poverty  in  China
and India. The recent upsurge in growth rates in China and India is seen widely as  the  “success”  story  of
globalisation. It is also claimed that these developments will make a significant impact on  the  reduction  of
global inequalities and poverty.
Although a number of  scholars  have  analysed  the  recent  economic  performance  of  China  and  India,
however,  these  studies  have  not  taken  into  account  the  past   policies   and   its   impact   on   current
performance. We find there is a gap in the  current  discussion,  which  overlooks  historical  and  economic
factors on the recent performance.
This article critically asses the claimed fall in global poverty due to mainly  the  rise  of  China  and  India  in
recent years. The article questions the “pro-globalisation” argument,  which  suggests  that  there  is  a  link
between ‘market liberal’ free market polices  and  falling  poverty.  It  is  argued  instead  that  the  evidence
concerning poverty reduction is ambiguous, and is not that the most successful  economies  have  adopted
pro-globalisation policies.
Studying  the  developmental  changes  taking  place  in  these  two  countries  is  important  because  they
together account for 37.5% of the global population. These populous neighbours, regarded  as  symbols  of
poverty and failure until two decades ago, contain large numbers of  people  are  living  below  the  officially
defined poverty line.
Key Words
China, India, neoliberal economic reforms, economic  growth,  FDI,  poverty,  inequality,  inter-sectoral  and
regional variations.
Introduction
This study is a modest attempt to understand the  dynamics  of  the  development  of  the
economies of China and India,  particularly  since  the  adoption  of  neoliberal  economic
reforms. Although a number of scholars have analysed the recent economic performance
of  China  and  India,  (Ahluwalia,  2004;  Bhalla,  2003;  Srinivasan,   2006   and   others)
however, these studies have not taken into account the past  policies  and  its  impact  on
current performance. We find there is a gap in  the  current  discussion,  which  overlooks
historical and economic factors on the recent performance. We will also critically  analyse
the  issue  of  poverty  reduction  in  these  two  economies   presented   by   international
financial institutions. (World Bank, 2006)
The paper deals with the comparative performance of both countries  for  the  last  twenty
five years. Indian development performance during  the  pre-reform  period  compared  to
other  developing  countries  such  as  Africa  and  Latin  America  was   impressive,   but
certainly not so impressive as the East Asian tiger economies.  These  two  nations,  also
known as ‘emerging economies’, account for  more  than  a  third  (37.5%)  of  the  global
population. These populous neighbours, regarded as symbols of poverty and failure  until
two decades ago, contain a large  number  of  people  living  below  the  officially  defined
poverty  line.  Another  similarity  is  that  both  are  ancient  cultures   with   distinguished
histories.  In  the  remote  past  both  nations  were  known   for   prosperity,   high   living
conditions and cultures. (Maddison, 1998) However, their most recent history  of  the  last
two centuries went through colonization, underdevelopment  and  transformation  of  their
economies to suit the specific needs of capitalism in the West European countries.
This article critically asses the claimed fall  in  global  poverty  due  to  mainly  the  rise  of
China and India in recent years. The article  questions  the  “pro-globalisation”  argument,
which suggests that there is a link between ‘market liberal’ free market polices and falling
poverty.  It  is  argued  instead   that   the   evidence   concerning   poverty   reduction   is
ambiguous,  and  is  not  that   the   most   successful   economies   have   adopted   pro-
globalisation policies.
The argument is outlined in four sections. The first section outlines briefly  the  over  view
on China and India economic performances. The  second  section  challenges  the  claim
made for poverty reduction due to neoliberal reforms and  globalisation  friendly  policies.
The third section examines its impact on sectoral and regional developments and  finally,
we critically evaluate the issues of foreign direct investment in both economies.
Both China and India have undertaken neoliberal economic reform policies. For instance,
since economic reforms in  1978,  Chinese  growth  has  been  remarkable  compared  to
other  both  developed  and  developing  countries.   While   in   India   economic   growth
performance since adoption of economic reforms in 1991, has  been  modest  and  falling
behind  on  many  fronts  relative  to  Chinese  performance  indicators.  It  is  known  that
Chinese and Indian GDP per capita (PPP terms) were at similar  levels  in  1978,  (1)  but
since then China’s rapid growth has left India behind.
The view of global enthusiasts is that the rapid economic growth in  China  and  India  will
have an important impact on global poverty.  Further  they  claim  that  with  the  onset  of
globalisation total number of poor people have declined.  They  cite  the  macroeconomic
variables such as rises in GDP and per capita income to validate their arguments. (Sala-i-
Martin, 2003; Bhalla, 2003; Srinivasan, 2006, among others) Others who have expressed
sceptical views on the impact of globalisation  have  tended  to  examine  the  patterns  of
inequality within these countries. They look at inter-regional development and  conditions
of the poor within the countries, which is hidden by the per capita  GDP  figures.  (Cornia,
2003; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2004)
Over the last two decades or so, the most populous nations in the world China and  India
have  been  growing  at  considerably  higher  rates   than   the   world   average.   These
unprecedented growth rates have provided new optimism for global enthusiasts.  (Fisher,
2003) According to Fisher (2003) these two countries together account for the majority of
the poor in the world and the above average  growth  rates  of  these  two  large  nations,
largely due to globalisation,  would reduce  global  inequality  and  poverty.  According  to
Forbes magazine the number of Indian billionaires rose from 9 in 2004 to  40  in  2007:  a
rich country like Japan had  only  24,  and  France  14.  The  combined  wealth  of  Indian
billionaires rose from US$106 to US$170 billion within a year,  2006-2007.  (cited  in  Jain
and Gupta, 2008)
Similar views  have  been  expressed  by  the  Business  Week  also:  “Our  line  of  Stars
recognises the growing importance of China  and  India  on  the  global  economic  stage.
Chinese companies, flush with cash from rising exports and cheap access to capital,  are
buying up energy assets and brand names around the world…. India continues to  evolve
from an economy that delivers  great  software,  outsourced  tax  returns,  blood-pressure
drugs,  and  angioplasties  cheaply   to   one   that   offers   high-end   services   such   as
management consulting and auto and aerospace design”. (2) (Business Week, 2005:11)
China and India: An overview
There have  been  various  studies  over  the  years  to  understand  the  differences  and
similarities of economic performance  and  development  strategies  in  China  and  India.
Comparing China with India, apart  from  differences  in  institutional  framework,  various
studies  have  argued  in  favour  of  India’s  long  term  growth  because   of   democratic
institutions. As Klein (2004) argues, “India is joining the high growth club  of  nations,  but
in their own way, as democratic a nation. Politically and culturally, the  two  nations  differ
markedly, but economically they have some great similarities”. (Klein, 2004:31) This view
is also presented by Sen (2005), “(China) become a leader  of  the  world  economy  with
stunning success, from this India, like many other countries,  has  been  learning  a  great
deal, particularly in  recent  years.  The  insularity  of  the  earlier  economic  approach  to
economic development needed to be replaced  and  here  the  experience  of  China  has
been profoundly important … But the role of  democratic  participation  in  India  suggests
that some learning and understanding may go in the other direction as well.” (Sen,  2005:
42)
In the terms of economic growth for the last two decades, China  and  India  have  shown
notable  performance  and  also  in  terms  of  integrating  into  the  global  economy  and
carrying  out  economic  reforms.  India  and  China  are  increasingly  perceived  as   two
emerging  economic  powers.  Both  countries  together  account  38   %   of   the   global
population (Chellaney 2006). However, they have followed different economic policies  in
the past. First China, after a long period of isolation and then India,  after  inward  looking
economic policies, began to open up  and  trying  to  integrate  with  the  global  economy
(Prasad and Rambaugh 2004). As  a  prominent  British  business  magazine  points  out:
“India is often portrayed as  an  elephant;  big,  lumbering  and  slow  off  the  mark.  Now
investment bank reports are beginning to talk of it as a new Asian ‘tiger’. If  that’s  what  it
wants to be, it makes sense for it  to  study  China:  the  tiger  in  front  is  Chinese”.  (The
Economist, 2005)
It is true that China’s overall economic growth rate from 1978  to  2001  was  on  average
8.1 annually. Its exports grew from US$18.1 billion in 1978  to  $266  billion  in  2001,  i.e.
annual growth rate of 12 %. By 2002, the manufacturing exports accounted  for  90  %  of
total exports.  (UNCTAD,  2005:  8)  China’s  share  of  world  GDP  (PPP  adjusted)  has
increased from 5 % in 1980 to 14 % in 2005.  These  impressive  figures  have  coincided
with  dramatic  shifts  in  economic  policy  since  1978,  including  abolition  of  commune
system in agriculture and allowing more autonomy for private sector in the economy.
The growth performance of Chinese economy  since  1990s  has  been  extraordinary  by
any standard. Between 1990 and 2005, per-capita GDP increased  at  the  rate  of  about
8.4 % per year. The upsurge in growth was driven by industrial expansion that has  made
China a manufacturing powerhouse. For example,  the  share  of  manufactures  in  GDP
rose from 33 % in 1990 to 42 % in 2005. This  rapid  industrial  development  was  largely
driven by country’s huge success in expanding international trade. The share of export in
GDP increased from 19 % in 1990 to 37  %  in  2005,  while  the  share  of  manufactured
goods  in  total  exports  increased  from  65  %   to   84   %   during   the   same   period.
(3) Moreover, the emergence of China as a very important nation for  manufacturing  has
been accompanied by the country’s dramatic rise in R&D expenditure.  The  country  has
become the fourth largest R&D spender in the world and its  total  spending  was  around
$85 billion (PPP) in 2003. India  itself  is  among  the  top  ten  R&D  spending  countries,
spending $30.62 billion, but  this  represents  only  one-third  of  China’s  spending.  (The
Economist, 2005)
The statistical profile is presented in Table 1, which  indicates  that  China’s  performance
indicators were better than India. China’s saving and investment rates were much  higher
than India’s. Per capita national income in China  is  double  (i.e.  US$1100)  than  India’s
US$ 540 in 2004. Similarly on the  question  of  people  living  below  the  poverty  line  in
China the figure is 16.6 % while for India number is significantly higher i.e. 34.7 %
Table 1: Relative Statistical Profile of two Economies, 2004 (US$)
|Indicator/Unit                               |India     |China       |
|Population (millions)                        |1,064     |1,288       |
|Density (sq mile)                            |358       |138         |
|Gross National Income (per capita) $         |540       |1,100       |
|Gross National Income at PPP (per capita) $  |3,062     |6,410       |
|Manufacturing value-added (bn $)             |67.1      |408.4       |
|Life expectancy                              |63        |71          |
|Malnutrition (under 5)                       |45.8      |12.1        |
|Poverty (% living below 1 $ a day)           |34.7      |16.6        |
|Electricity production (billion kwh)         |596.5     |1,640.5     |
|Foreign Exchange Reserve (bn$)               |144       |711         |
|Tourist arrivals (millions)                  |2.4       |33.1        |
|FDI inflows (billions $)                     |3.4       |66.6        |
Source: World Development Indicators, 2006, The  World  Bank,  Washington  D.C.;  The
Reserve Bank of India; The People’s Bank of China, several years.
Will Hutton (2007) points out three major factors contributing to this  upsurge  in  Chinese
growth. Firstly, the role played by the state, for example, the village industries that played
a  vital  role  in  the  economic  growth  throughout  1980s.  Secondly,   Deng   Xiaoping’s
modernization  policies  highlighted  the  importance  of  economic  development.  As   he
notes:
“Today’s China could not have started from nothing  in  1978”.  (Hutton,  2007:90)  Under
Mao Zedong, China did achieve in increasing industrial growth and both living  conditions
and life expectancy rose substantially after the 1949 Chinese  revolution.  Thirdly,  Hutton
calls it “a significant element of luck, which then has been clearly exploited  by  Chinese”.
(Hutton, 2007:96) It happened at a time when China  was  recovering  from  the  crisis  of
1989 and actively seeking foreign capital and technology to play an important role  in  the
Chinese economy. And also the  willingness  from  the  Chinese  Diaspora,  especially  in
Hong  Kong  and  other  South  East  Asian  countries  to  provide  most  of   the   foreign
investment before 2002. (Hutton, 2007:146)
Neo-liberal Economic Reforms and Reducing Poverty
India after 1950s has followed “mixed” economic policies  with  significant  private  sector
participation. However, after  the  Gulf  War  in  1991,  the  Indian  economy  experienced
acute crisis, which culminated into BoP crisis. Under such circumstances the government
accepted  IMF  conditionality  and  adopted  the  neoliberal  economic  reforms   (Siddiqui
1990).   The  neoliberal   economic   reforms   undertaken   in   1991   have   substantially
expanded the scope of private  capital  and  reduced  state  regulation.  (4)  (Girdner  and
Siddiqui, 2008) Moreover, with  the  changing  global  situation  and  the  collapse  of  the
Soviet Union, the Indian ruling elites realised that following the advice of the  international
financial institutions would help them to  have  greater  access  to  western  markets  and
technology. However, the pre-reform period is widely considered as period  of  a  path  of
slow growth of around 3 % “Hindu rate of growth” to a higher  growth  in  the  post-reform
period of average 6 % per year. (Ahluwalia, 2004; Srinivasan, 2006)
China, by contrast, had a very different institutional structure for  most  of  the  pre-reform
period, where command economy had played a key role in  resource  mobilisation.  Even
after the wide ranging reforms that have taken place after 1978, government influence on
the economy remains substantial. Because of the significance of state owned enterprises
in total production and investment and  its  ability  to  influence  aggregate  demand.  The
state owned enterprises (SOEs) still have a significant, but in recent years  declining  role
in the economy.
Here we will briefly analyse macroeconomic variables  during  the  post-reform  period  in
both countries. The Chinese  share  in  world  imports,  especially  in  manufacturing  has
increased from 1.1 % in 1980 to  1.7  %  in  1990  and  rose  to  6.3  in  2004.  Imports  of
machines  and  telecommunication  equipment  did  help  the  country’s  export  sector  to
become more competitive. India’s import share  during  the  same  period  changed  from
.05% in 1980 to 0.8 % in 2004. (Wolf, 2008)
In the last decade China has emerged as the largest exporter of manufactured  goods  to
the United States with a merchandise trade surplus of about  $180  billion.  This  did  help
China in becoming the biggest holder of US dollars as reserve (Fishman 2006).  In  terms
of merchandise exports, the Chinese  were  about  eight  fold  those  of  India,  in  service
Chinese lead was small.  In  recent  years  China  has  emerged  as  the  second  largest
merchandise  exporter  in  the  global  economy,  accounting  about  9  %  of   the   global
merchandise trade, India’s place was twentieth in the league of world traders, accounting
only 1.1 % of multilateral trade. (5)
On the other crucial macro-economic issue, China recoded  trade  surplus  over  the  last
decade, while India recorded deficit. Since 1991 foreign exchange for both countries  has
increased dramatically.  However,  China’s  reserve  has  risen  more  than  five  times  of
India’s. For example, in 2005 China was the second largest holder of US dollars  reserve,
while India was the fifth. On FDI too India was much behind China (World Bank 2006 and
2007).
There are various reasons for the differences in economic performance of both economies.  The
crucial difference is the Chinese savings rate, which is in  the  high  40’s  in  nearly  twice
than India’s in the mid 20’s. Indeed given the higher saving  rates  combined  with  higher
increase in FDI inflows, China  has  witnessed  a  remarkable  success  in  investment  in
manufacturing sector and infrastructure.
On the basis of rapid economic growth in China and India, the World  Bank  has  claimed
that global poverty has fallen in the last twenty year (World Bank  1997,  2004,  2005).  In
1980, there were 1.4 billion people living in absolute poverty  and  by  1998,  the  number
had fallen to 1.2 billion. (World Bank, 2002: 30)  Other recent  studies  also  suggest  that
the number of people living in poverty has  fallen  by  400  million.  (Chen  and  Ravallion,
2004; Ravallion, 2008)
The prime reason provided for poverty  reduction  is  said  to  be  due  to  the  countries  that  have
adopted ‘globalization-friendly’ policies. The World Bank (2002) Report is the most  exponent  of
such view. The Report has conclusion based on a study of  92  countries,  the  study  differentiates
more and less “Globalised” countries. This is measured by examining trade  tariffs  from  1985  to
97 and trade volumes (based on GDP ratios) from 1975 to  1997.  The  main  argument  is  that
more globalised countries had higher rates  than  less  globalised.  The  study  concludes
that market friendly ‘proglobalisation’ policies are  good  for  growth  and  ultimately,  it  is
good for poverty reduction. Such claims heavily rely on the rapid  growth  of  and  poverty
reduction in China as pointed out in the following assertions:
“Since China has had such a remarkable  growth  record  over  the  last  two  decades,  the  authors
(Dollar,and Kraay, 2002) should not have been bothered to include the other countries. All  that  is
needed to obtain the desired conclusions is that  China’s  growth  accelerates”.  (Milanovic,  2003:
674) This is clear that if China is excluded, then the claim  of  success  would  have  been  hard  to
defend.
Moreover, the claims made for poverty reduction has  been  challenged  in  a  number  of
ways. Absolute poverty is defined as those people living on an income of less than US $1
a day, based on PPP exchange rates at 1985 prices. In  fact  Reddy  and  Pogge  (2003)
suggest that PPP is not correct measurement of  what  the  poor  actually  consume  in  a
developing country. The PPP does not actually measure what  the  poor  households  are
consuming, but instead measures what everybody  consumes  in  a  developing  country.
These figures also show downward trends over time, because the food share is falling  in
consumption spending, while services share is rising. The assumption is that the  income
of every household rises equally. This is very unlikely and rich spends more  on  services
than poor.
Even on the 1 US$ count, the number of those in poverty has risen  by  about  one-third  in
Latin America, and one-half in sub-Saharan  Africa.  (Sumner,  2004)  Therefore,  due  to
these above reasons we should treat the claims  for  a  decrease  in  global  poverty  with
some scepticism. Moreover, the  questions  arise  how  “openness”  is  measured,  which
essentially relies on trade/GDP  ratios.  It  is  also  possible  for  a  country  to  have  high
trade/GDP ratios and yet still have relatively closed trade policies,  as  was  the  case  for
most of the East  countries  in  the  early  phase  of  their  industrialisation.  Some  of  the
poorest countries actually have high trade/GDP ratios. From the period of 1999  to  2001,
more than half of the least developed countries had actually higher trade/GDP ratios than
the most developed world.  (UNCTAD, 2002: 3)
We find slightly exaggeration in the claim about relationship between openness  and  high  growth
rates when examining the figures from  China  and  India.  Both  countries  are  counted  in  highly
globalised countries even though their trade and investment polices remain less open than some of
the least developed countries.  The  claim  also  does  not  stand  with  the  reality  of  growth.  For
example, in India,  where  rapid  growth  pre-dated  their  adoption  of  “free-market”  polices,  the
growth rates in the 1990s were hardly difference from the 1980s.  (Rodrik,  2001)   It  is  true  that
average tariff rates in India declined from 80 % in 1991 to 40 % in 2001. However, despite  lifting
of some restrictions on FDI,  India  remains  far  from  open  economies.  Capital  controls  remain
strong and still relatively high tariff on selected imports.
In India the percentage of population below poverty line has fallen from 36 %  in  1993-94
to 27 % in 2004-05, However, the absolute number of total poor  stood  at  302  million  in
2005, accounting for a quarter of total poor in the world.
The evidence in China regarding poverty reduction appears that poverty has declined  by
45 % in two decades from 53 % in 1981 to 8 % in 2001. While, in India poverty  reduction
was only 17 % during the  same  period.  (The  World  Bank,  2006)  However,  when  we
analyse this figure  within  agriculture  sector  in  India  the  whole  arguments  looks  less
convincing. For example, within the agriculture sector if we look at the data on food  grain
output for India, it shows stagnation. The total food production  in  India  in  2001-02  was
212.9 million tones. For the next five years the corresponding figures were  174.4,  213.2,
198.4, 208.4, and 213 million tones respectively. This clearly shows that there is a severe
supply side constraint in food grain in India during the current decade. (Patnaik,  2007)  It
will have a wide impact on the largely rural population. For instance,  the  per  capita  real
income of more than  two-third  of  India’s  total  population  depends  on  agriculture  and
allied activities, which are lower  in  2008  than  it  was  in  2002.  Expenditure  data  from
National Sample Survey Organisation’s (NSS) 61st Round (2004-05) show that rural  and
urban per capita cloth consumption, real  food  expenditure  and  calorie  intake  have  all
declined from their already low levels since 1993-94. (Patnaik, 2007)
In India we have witnessed the extensive poverty coexisting with growth. The  number  of
people living in absolute poverty has  declined  slowly  over  the  25  years,  but  still  302
million people live in absolute poverty. Table  2  shows  the  percentage  of  people  living
below poverty line in India. There has been some progress made in  reducing  poverty  in
both urban and rural areas since late 1970s, but still  a  large  number  of  people  remain
poor.
Table 2: Trends in Poverty in India (% of people living below poverty line)
|Year                   |Rural                  |Urban                  |
|                       |Planning Commission    |Planning Commission    |
|                       |estimate               |estimate               |
|1977-78                |45.2                   |53.1                   |
|1987-88                |38.2                   |39.1                   |
|1993-94                |32.4                   |37.3                   |
|1999-2000              |23.6                   |27.1                   |
Source: Economic Survey, various issues; Sen and Himanshu (2004)
In contrast China did better on the question of absolute poverty, which declined  from  53  %  to  8
%. However, inequality in China also grew faster than in India. Inequality has  grown  also  grown
in India since the adoption of neo-liberal economic polices, but  less  sharply.  The  20  %  poorest
section of the  population’s  share  in  national  income  is  5.9  %,  compared  to  8.2  %  in  India.
However, since China has double average per capita income of India.  Therefore,  the  poorest  are
worse off in India in absolute terms. (Radhakrishna, 2008) 
In the post reform period the Chinese record in terms of the reduction in  the  absolute  number  of
poor  is  impressive  (Bouche  et  al  2004).   In   early   1980s   people’s   communes   were
dismantled,  land  was  allotted  to  households  and  the  farmers  were   encouraged   to
abandon the previous “grain first” policy and to diversify production and farm prices  were
increased by about 30 %. At the same times the production and  availability  of  fertilizers
and other agricultural inputs  were  increased  steadily.  The  government  also  launched
poverty reduction plan (1994-2000) to bring down the number of  absolute  poor  from  80
million to 30 million by 2001. (6) This along  with  the  sharp  rise  in  farm  product  prices
especially   food   has   helped   the   farming    communities    to    raise    their    income.
(Chandrasekhar, and Ghosh, 2004)
The available evidence suggests that early years of reforms had worsened inequality in  China.  As
Table 3 indicates that the national, rural-urban and regional inequality measured  by  Gini,
have risen over the period of 1984-2000 (Kanbur and Zhang  2005b).  It  seems  that  the
important reasons for this rising inequality was due to  attract  investment  to  the  coastal
regions, the government provided a range of incentives.
Table 3: Estimates of Inequality in China from 1984 to 2000
|Year         |Gini (%)     |GE (%)       |Rural-Urban  |Inland-Coast |
|1984         |25.6         |10.9         |6.3          |0.4          |
|1987         |27.0         |12.0         |6.8          |0.6          |
|1989         |29.7         |14.4         |9.3          |1.0          |
|1990         |30.1         |14.9         |9.5          |1.0          |
|1993         |32.2         |16.8         |10.9         |1.7          |
|1995         |33.0         |17.7         |11.5         |2.3          |
|1998         |34.4         |19.6         |12.2         |2.9          |
|2000         |37.2         |24.8         |13.9         |3.8          |
Source: Kanbur and Zhang, 2005a.
Elisabeth Croll (2006) studied the impact of economic reforms on Chinese people.  In her
detailed study of living conditions for the  last  30  years  found  that  inequality  has  risen
sharply.  For  instance,  the  top  10  %  of  the  China’s  population  owned  45  %  of  the
country’s personal wealth, while the bottom 10% had just 1.4 percent.
As Croll (2006) notes:
“Chinese  society  is  more  accurately  represented  by  an  income  or   wealth   pyramid
showing a very small  minority  at  the  top,  the  majority  at  the  base  and  a  small  and
burgeoning middle class sandwiched between. Not only  are  those  between  fewer  than
commonly imagined, but many are more likely to be downwardly than  upwardly  mobile”.
(Croll, 2006:22) She also adds that  there  are  also  huge  differences  between  different
regions of China, with rural poverty concentrated in the western  provinces.  (Croll,  2006;
Weiss, 2002)
Inter-sectoral Changes and Inter-regional Disparities
In order to understand the overall impact of  economic  reforms  it  important  to  examine
inter-sectoral changes. As it has significant impact on  job  creation.  Analysing  at  sector
wise growth from 1991-92 to 2004-05 the growth in the primary sector and the secondary
sector was slower than tertiary sector in India. In the same period  growth  in  the  tertiary
sector was higher in comparison  with  the  period  from  1980-81  to  1990-91.  Below  in
Table 4 we present  data  from  the  developing  countries.  We  find  that  contribution  of
agriculture sector in the GDP for  all  the  developing  countries  shown  in  the  table  has
declined. However, in South Korea, China, Malaysia case the increase  of  manufacturing
contribution to GDP was quiet dramatic during their reform  period,  in  contrast  to  much
slower increase in India post-economic reform period.
Table 4: Sectoral Distribution of GDP. Selected Asian Countries
|Country  |                   |          Industry |          Services   |
|         |Agriculture        |                   |                     |
|                 |1960             |1980             |2000             |
|Agriculture      |3.1              |-1.5             |3.0              |
|Industry         |7.6              |-1.2             |6.5              |
|Service          |6.7              |4.5              |8.4              |
|GDP              |5.6              |1.3              |6.2              |
Source: Reserve Bank of India and Ministry of  Finance,  various  years,  Government  of
India: New Delhi
In India, a decline in the growth of the agriculture sector was observed in the 1990s, (see
Table 5) which continued until recently.  Also  yields  per  hectare  for  a  number  of  food
crops declined during the  same  period  (Siddiqui  1999).  This  also  coincided  with  the
decline in governmental expenditure in agriculture,  &  subsidies  for  fertilizers  in  recent
years. (Patnaik, 2007) Growth in agriculture, for the production of  both  food  &  non-food
crops, is based on  a  number  of  assumptions  pertaining  to  government  expenditures,
input  prices,  rainfall,  and  price  behaviour.  (Planning  Commission,  2007:  New  Delhi,
Siddiqui, 1997)
The industrial sector is much  larger  in  China.  In  value  terms  manufacturing  produces  six
times higher in China than in India.
In  agriculture  sector,  China  began  economic  reforms  in  the  early  1980s.  Collective
farming  were  eliminated,  peasants  were  encouraged  to   manage   their   land   as   a
household unit, being  responsible  for  their  own  production  and  sell  their  produce  to
market. As a consequence, between 1978 and 1992, China’s  agriculture  output  rose  to
average about 6 % per year. While the annual average rate of growth of world agriculture
output was only 1.8 %.  By achieving higher growth rates, the sector  not  only  increased
farmers’ income, but also created more rural jobs  and  higher  wage  rates.  In  1980  the
sectoral division of Chinese economy  was  such:  agriculture  30%,  industry  49  %  and
services 21 %. However, later in 2003, the share  of  agriculture  fell,  while  industry  and
service sector grew. However, the growth in  manufacturing  sector  was  remarkable  i.e.
from 42 % in 1990 to 53 % in 2003.
In contrast to China, India’s sectoral changes were: while the agriculture fell  from  over  40  %  to
23% from 1980 to 2003 (Dev 2008a, Ghosh 2008), it was not the manufacturing sector that
took over, but rather the service sector which became  the  dominant  sector  contributing
over half of India’s income.
In contrast to average 6 % of Chinese agricultural  output  growth  during  the  1980s,  on
Indian agriculture performance Dev (2008b) has found that, ‘The average growth  rate  of
agriculture during the 9th and 10th  Plan  periods  (1997-98  to  2006-07)  was  2.5  %  per
annum, while the  growth  on  non-agriculture  during  this  period  was  around  8  %  per
annum. The gap in per worker productivity between agriculture  and  non-agriculture  has
increased significantly. Farming has become an  unviable  activity,  particularly  for  small
and marginal farmers. On average, there has been one farmer suicide every  30  minutes
since 2002’. (Dev, 2008b: 33)
The output of service sector as  a  %  of  GDP  was  higher  for  India  with  51%  in  2003
(Siddiqui 2005), whereas China’s gross output in service  sector  remained  33  %  during
the same year. India witnessed greater value addition in this sector i.e.  48%  in  India  vs
34 % in  China,  mainly  due  to  rapid  expansion  in  government  administration  and  IT
sector, which only employees 0.8 % of the services workforce and yet has exports  worth
$9.2 billion. Export growth of service was 15 % per annum in 1990s in India and 21  %  in
the latter of  the  1990s.  Between  1990  and  2004  the  export  of  commercial  services
increased  from  nearly  43  %  of  total  services  exports  to  75.1  %.  The   category   of
commercial services includes ICT, information and other telecommunication services.
During the pre-economic reform period (i.e.  from  1950  to  1990),  the  Indian  economic
growth rate was 4 %  per  annum  and  growth  in  employment  opportunities  were  2  %
during that period. While in the post-reform period (i.e.  from  1991  to  2007)  the  growth
rate was 7.5 % per annum but growth in regular employment was 1 % only. According  to
official statistics, between 1991 and 2004 employment declined  in  the  organised  public
sector and the job creation in the private sector was also slow. (7)
An analysis  of  inter-regional  development  is  crucial  to  understand  overall  impact  of
neoliberal  economic  reforms.  This  is  special  problems  for   India   because   its   less
developed regions are also more  densely  populated.  The  opposite  happens  to  be  in
China e.g. in China the more developed regions happens to be most populous  and  least
developed regions are less densely  populated.  During  the  last  two  and  half  decades
quality of life for nearly 400 millions  Chinese  who  live  in  Southern  and  eastern  costal
region regions have improved due to a steady rise  in  their  real  income.  Scholars  have
given a  number  of  reasons  for  differentiations  in  inter-regional  growth.  For  instance
Kanbur and Zhang (2005a) state that regional inequality in China could  be  explained  by
factors like  openness  and  decentralisation.  According  to  them,  regional  variations  in
growth have taken place due to  the  evolution  of  spatial  inequalities  in  education  and
healthcare provisions in China. This It seem to suggest  that  effective  policy  making  by
the state will help to alter inter-regional differences. (Kanbur and Zhang 2005a)
In India the  overall  growth  rates  have  been  around  6  %  as  shown  in  the  Table  6.
However, the growth rates vary in different states. Here we have presented data for  both
for pre-reform and post-reform period.  We find that  poor  states,  for  example,  such  as
Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh have witnessed decline in growth rates in post-reform
period compare to pre-reform period.  We  have  analysed  earlier  that  these  very  poor
states  happens  to   be   densely   populated.   Thus,   in   the   light   of   these   regional
developments the claim for reduction in poverty levels in India is less convincing.
Table 6: Economic Growth in Major Indian States, 1980-2005 (%)
|States                        |1980-90    |1990-2005    |1980-2005     |
|Andhra Pradesh                |4.81       |5.33         |5.1           |
|Assam                         |3.91       |3.00         |3.4           |
|Bihar                         |5.20       |4.2          |4.6           |
|Gujarat                       |5.71       |8.11         |7.1           |
|Haryana                       |6.68       |6.63         |6.65          |
|Himachal Pradesh              |6.10       |6.44         |6.3           |
|Karnatka                      |6.10       |6.38         |6.3           |
|Kerala                        |4.50       |5.69         |5.2           |
|Madhya Pradesh                |5.18       |4.74         |4.9           |
|Maharastra                    |5.98       |5.92         |5.95          |
|Orissa                        |5.85       |3.94         |4.7           |
|Punjab                        |5.14       |4.14         |4.6           |
|Rajasthan                     |7.17       |5.68         |6.3           |
|Tamil Nadu                    |6.35       |5.70         |5.97          |
|Uttar Pradesh                 |5.88       |3.76         |4.64          |
|West Bengal                   |5.20       |7.12         |6.32          |
|All India                     |5.60       |5.90         |5.8           |
Source: Economic Survey various issues. Government of India
We think it is important to examine particularly agricultural growth rates  in  Indian  states,
already discussed in  previous  section  that  this  sector  being  the  largest  employer  of
workforce. Table 7 present agricultural growth rates in  different  states  India  during  the
pre and  post-reform  periods.  Among  the  low  income  states  such  as  Uttar  Pradesh,
Madhya  Pradesh  and  Orissa,  agriculture  growth  decelerated  compare  to  pre-reform
period. However all India agriculture growth  rates  has  also  declined  from  3.6  %  from
1984 to 1995 to 1.8 % in 1995-2005 average per annum, which is lower  than  population
growth.
Table 7: Growth Rates of Agriculture in Indian Sates (in %)
|States               |1984-85 to 1995-96    |1995-96 to 2004-05 |
|Andhra Pradesh       |3.18                  |2.69               |
|Assam                |1.65                  |0.95               |
|Bihar                |-1.71                 |3.51               |
|Gujarat              |5.09                  |0.48               |
|Haryana              |4.60                  |1.98               |
|Karnatka             |3.92                  |0.03               |
|Kerala               |3.60                  |-3.54              |
|Madhya Pradesh       |3.63                  |-0.23              |
|Maharastra           |6.66                  |0.10               |
|Orissa               |-1.18                 |0.11               |
|Punjab               |4.00                  |2.16               |
|Rajasthan            |5.52                  |0.30               |
|Tamil Nadu           |4.95                  |-1.36              |
|Uttar Pradesh        |2.82                  |1.87               |
|West Bengal          |4.63                  |2.67               |
|All India            |3.62                  |1.85               |
Source: Planning Commission, (2007) Government of India, New Delhi
In order to become modern industrial nation, basic education is  considered  very  crucial.
East Asian countries during  their  early  periods  of  industrialisation  they  had  achieved
quite higher levels of enrolment. In India as the Table 8 shows us not  only  that  all  India
gross enrolment ratio is low, but also it varies very much in different states. (8)
Table 8: Gross Enrolment Ratios – 2003-04 in Indian States (%)
|States             |Upper Primary       |Secondary        |
|                   |(11-14 years)       |(14-18 years)    |
|Andhra Pradesh     |64.9                |44.6             |
|Assam              |N.A.                |N.A.             |
|Bihar              |25.3                |16.9             |
|Gujarat            |70.1                |40.0             |
|Haryana            |65.5                |45.5             |
|Karnatka           |76.2                |41.7             |
|Kerala             |93.6                |48.0             |
|Madhya Pradesh     |63.3                |34.9             |
|Maharastra         |87.6                |53.9             |
|Orissa             |54.0                |32.7             |
|Punjab             |60.1                |39.0             |
|Rajasthan          |61.5                |32.6             |
|Tamil Nadu         |100.4               |56.9             |
|Uttar Pradesh      |48.6                |37.9             |
|West Bengal        |64.3                |32.6             |
|All India          |62.4                |38.9             |
Source: NSS 61st Round Report No.517, Selected Educational Statistics, 2003/04; Note:
N.A. not available
Foreign Direct Investment Flows and Integration with Global Capitalism
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was seen as very important factor to  make  globalisation
success and ultimately reduce poverty in China and  India.  It  is  true  that  foreign  direct
investment  has  been  the  most  important  source   of   capital,   new   technology   and
management  in  China  since  1978.  The  largest  proportion  of  overseas  capital   was
invested in manufacturing sector and consisted of Greenfield investment in China. During
the 1980s, FDI was largely invested in the labour-intensive manufacturing, especially into
light  manufacturing  sector.  However,  in  the  1990s,  we   find   slightly   changed   and
increased proportion foreign capital went to estate sector and high tech industries.
China has demonstrated the ability to attract foreign investments substantially on  its  own
terms and also wise strategy  to  utilize  them.  According  to  official  estimates,  in  2004
China received over $60 billion as FDI, While India’s just $5 billion, showing  almost  at  a
12:1  ratio.  Moreover,  almost  68  %  of  the  FDI  in  China  originates  from  East  Asian
countries, mainly from people of Chinese origin. (Dunning, 2001) China is still  dominated
by state enterprises and a policy which makes credits easy available to them. This  policy
cannot  easily  be  reversed  because  of  enormous  social  consequences  of  rendering
millions of people unemployed.
Table 9: Share as proportion of the total of Foreign Direct Investment inflows to  Asia  (in
%)
|              |1990          |1995          |2002          |
|India         |0.76          |2.8           |3.3           |
|China         |18.0          |47.6          |45.9          |
|Hong Kong     |4.0           |8.2           |22.4          |
|Singapore     |24.8          |13.7          |8.4           |
Source: World Investment Report, various issues.
China’s reliance on foreign direct investment (FDI) as an instrument  for  transforming  its
economy witnessed a dramatic results and surging from almost zero in the late  1970s  to
about $40 to $50 billion a year, roughly 5 % of the GDP. (see Table 9) As a  result  China
in the last more than two decades has built a competitive manufacturing for exports.  The
growth of China’s trade has been four and half times that of world trade  since  1978  and
the country’s share rose from barely  0.9  %  in  1978  to  3.7  %  in  2005.  Two-thirds  of
China’s exports come from MNCs mainly owned by overseas Chinese, Japanese and US
companies that besides bringing capital  and  new  technology  also  provided  access  to
foreign markets. Foreign investors took the benefits of low labour  costs  and  the  largest
share of investment about 60 % went to manufacturing sector, followed by  24  %  in  real
estate and transport, wholesale and retail at 6  %.  Moreover,  among  the  manufacturing
about half of the FDI has been in labour intensive industries such as textiles and clothing,
furniture and food processing. (9) Thus, the FDI contributed  directly  to  the  employment
generation.  The  strategy  is  has  been  pushed  beyond  the  Special  Economic  Zones
(SEZs) in the coastal regions towards inland provinces.
The inflow of FDI between these countries has been quite different not only in term of amount but
also the FDI origin. (10) India’s growth has been  till  now,  mainly  supported  by  domestic
enterprises, as against foreign financed enterprise in China.  (Wolf,  2006)  Some  argues
that IT sector could play increasingly vital role  due  to  the  existence  of  huge  educated
unemployed workforce.  However,  we  should  not  exaggerate  as  IT  related  output  is
currently less than 1 % of the GDP, employing over half million  people.  (11)  We  should
not ignore the critical  role  of  manufacturing  sector  in  employment  generation  in  less
developed country like India.
We need to mention here that initially in  1979,  four  SEZs  in  China  were  chosen  for  overseas
capital investment, which were: Guangdong, Jiangsu, Fujian  and  Shandong.  Coastal  areas  were
preferred first for FDI and later into the inland provinces. By 1990s FDI has spread to  all  regions
of China. However, there  is  wide  regional  differences  are  found  in  terms  of  overseas  capital
investment. For example, just five regions are able to attract about 64.6  %  of  total  invested  into
China.
The  role  of  foreign  investment  should  not  be  exaggerated  in   developing   countries
economies. We need to look briefly the role of big corporations in recent  years  and  also
examine from historical perspective. The global corporations, mainly based in  the  West,
continue to remain the main supporters of  globalization.  These  corporations  constantly
look for opportunities all over the globe for lowering costs and  new  markets.  During  the
19th century of the imperial phase of capitalist  expansion,  industrial  and  manufacturing
enterprises from the  West  followed  various  methods  of  expropriation,  organising  raw
material  supplies  from  colonies  from  low  cost,  while  at  the  same  time  forcing   the
countries to open up their markets. Contrary to the widely held  belief,  military  and  state
rather  than  ‘free  market’  policies  were  deployed  to  promote  the  business  interests.
However, what we see the relationship currently between China and the big  corporations
based in the West are not like what prevailed in the  ‘Anglo-globalisation’  period  of  19th
century, where a handful of west European countries at the centre forced the countries at
the periphery to adopt macroeconomic policies suitable to the former.
Furthermore, the recent crisis in the west associated with economic downturn  and  stock
market crashes are setting a new precedent. As this brief  quotation  explains:  “this  time
(shift) is permanent and far reaching – a fundamental shift in power  from  the  developed
world to the developing world, and above all China  and  India.  We  have  not  witnessed
anything like this since the inception  of  the  West  as  an  industrial  powerhouse  in  the
19th century. …it heralds a major reduction in the global economic and  political  influence
of the US, rather in the manner that the 1931 crisis announced the final and  belated  end
of Britain’s global economic supremacy”. (Jacques, 2008)
We find it is important here to provide briefly past historical background of the economies
of China and  India  in  order  to  understand  the  differences  in  their  current  economic
performances. The Opium wars of 1839  were  followed  by  century  of  subjugation  and
humiliation for China by  the  Western  powers  where  unequal  treaties  were  forced  on
China. (12) In India, by mid of the 17th century British East  India  Company  was  able  to
establish trading post in Surat, Mumbai (earlier  known  as  Bombay)  and  Calcutta.  The
growing internal crises in the Mughal Empire and Afghan invasion,  followed  by  constant
rebellion from Marathas provided unique opportunity for Britain to colonise India.  And  by
the early 19th century Britain  treated  India  as  cheap  supplier  of  raw  materials  and  a
captive markets for British goods, which  were  admitted  duty  free.  (13)  (Bagchi,  1976)
Moreover, there was a transfer of surplus without any quid pro quo to  India,  (14)   which
financed, such capital inflows as did occur during the 19th and up  to  the  1st  World  War,
the development of Britain and other temperate  regions  of  white  settlements.  (Patnaik,
1997; Siddiqui, 1996) The colonial state laid claim to part of the  surplus  which  it  simply
expropriated and  shipped  abroad  (known  as  “Drain  Theory”).  (15)  The  commodities
which  were  produced  by  the  metropolis  were  not  the  same  as  pre-colonial  period.
(Bagchi, 1972) Therefore, the production structures have to be changed for the benefit of
metropolis capital. (16)
Prominent economic historian Maddison (2001) has worked out  that  per  capita  income
for both China and India in 1990 constant US  dollar  in  purchasing  power  parity  (PPP)
terms for different periods. The two countries started the  20th  century  at  a  low  income
level. The share of their income was much smaller than their world population share.  For
example, according to Maddison in 1913 China’s share  of  the  world  GDP  was  8.9  %,
while the share of population was 26.4 %. India’s GDP share was 7.5 %,  while  its  share
of world population was 17 % for the same period. The  data  shows  the  trends  in  GDP
growth and per capita GDP at constant prices during the period from 1900-01 to 1946-47
reveals that during the first half of the  20th  century,  there  was  near  stagnation  in  per
capita GDP, while growth in GDP was minimal. Maddison (2001) finds that the  growth  in
national income in India was 0.8 % per year, whereas the increase in  per-capita  income
was  almost  negligible  at   0.4   %   pear   year.   Moreover,   the   colonial   period   was
characterised by open economies, balanced budget and  unregulated  markets.  (Bagchi,
1976; Maddison, 2001)
On the issue of long term perspective, until the early 19th century China and India were among
the largest economies  in  the  world.  Maddison  (1998)  calculated  at  the  beginning  of
18th century China and India together accounted for,  in  purchasing  power  parity  terms,
about 45.7 of the total global GDP (see Table 10). In 1820, beginning of capitalist  epoch,
as Maddison has termed it, China and India together accounted for 48.1 % of  the  global
GDP. During the same period India’s GDP alone was 15.7 %, and China’s was 32.4 % of
the world’s GDP. Europe’s GDP (26.6 %) was smaller than China, but  larger  than  India.
(Maddison, 1998)
Table 10: Distribution of world income (in PPP terms, as a %)
|         |1700     |1820     |1890     |1952     |1978     |1995     |
|China    |23.1     |32.4     |13.2     |5.2      |5.0      |10.9     |
|India    |22.6     |15.7     |11.0     |3.8      |3.4      |4.6      |
Source: Angus Maddison, 1998.
A comparison of figures after adjusting for PPP makes a  substantial  difference  of  share  of  both
countries in global GDP growth as seen in Table 11. The share of these two  countries  has
been increasing over time, although more in case of China than India because  of  higher
GDP growth in the former. Table 11 presents increasing  share  of  China  and  India’s  in
global GDP. For instance, China’s share in global GDP has risen from 1.6 %  in  1990  to
4.6 % in 2004, while India share increase was much slower i.e. from 1.4 to 1.6  %  during
the same period.
Table 11: Share of China and India in global GDP and its growths
|                     |Share in Global GDP (%)                    |
|                     |1990               |2004                   |
|China                |1.63               |4.68                   |
|India                |1.46               |1.67                   |
|World                |100.00             |100.00                 |
Source: World Bank, 2006, Table 4.1 and 4.2
Conclusion
This  article  has  questioned  some  assertions  concerning   globalisation   and   poverty
reduction in relation to China and India, the two important so-called success stories  from
where the general optimism has derived. The argument that  poverty  has  been  reduced
has been problematic (Patnaik 2000). The proponents have argued that the  high  growth
rates  is  direct  consequence  of  market  friendly   polices   than   other   countries.   The
experiences  of  other  developing  countries  such  as  Sub-Saharan  African  and   Latin
American countries run counter to this argument (Siddiqui 1998).
The neoliberal economic reforms undertaken have  had  different  impact  on  China  and
India in terms of job creation.  In  Chinese  case  economic  reforms  did  create  new  job
opportunities in fast expanding manufacturing sector, while in India it did not happen  and
employment growth was below  GDP  growth.  From  1990  to  2003,  in  China  industrial
sector increased on average by 13 % annually, while in India it was less than  half  at  6.1
%. Chinese agricultural growth was 4 % per year while  in  India  it  grew  only  3  %.  The
growth in different sectors of the economy also affected the job creation  process  for  the
two nations. China’s workforce was 705 million and about 50 % of the  total  employed  in
agriculture sector, 29 % in service sector  and  22  %  in  industry  in  2003.  By  contrast,
India’s total workforce was 482 million, agriculture was  the  major  employer  with  60  %,
industry 17%, and service sector employed 23 % 2004.
The foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investments (FPI) are considered crucial
both to achieve  higher  growth  rates  and  global  integration.  Since  reform  China  has
received much more FDI than India. A significant proportion  of  FDI  inflows  to  China  is
from overseas Chinese. China’s policy  of  creating  special  economic  zones  (SEZs)  to
attract foreign  investment  by  exempting  investors  from  regulations  and  by  providing
better infrastructure has  proved  very  successful.  Moreover,  in  large  share  of  foreign
inflow of capital was invested  in  export  sectors  and  infrastructure.  This  policy  further
benefited Chinese export firm to emerge more competitive in global production.
We find that the radical agrarian  reforms  during  the  early  Chinese  revolution  ensured
control of the state particularly over investment in capital assets and financial  institutions
were  meant  that  the  process  of  integration  with  the  global  economy  was   radically
different from that which occurred in India. For example, during early years of  revolution,
China had already dealt the basic development issues such as  adequate  food  supplies,
primary education, literacy rate among female  population,  availability  of  health  care  to
rural inhabitants etc. As a consequence, the domestic market for  consumption  of  goods
was also larger than in India. In early years of opening  up,  government  ensured  higher
prices for agricultural produce and  this  kept  number  of  absolute  poor  down.  Chinese
government  also  focused  on  increased   investment   on   infrastructure   development,
combined with controlled trade reforms  and  investment  liberalisation  expanded  export
industries and generated substantial employment.
In India sector wise growth from 1991 to 2005 the growth in the  primary  sector  and  the
secondary sector was slower in  comparison  with  the  tertiary  sector.  A  decline  in  the
growth  of  the  agriculture  sector  was  observed  in  the  1990s  (Siddiqui  2008),  which
continued until recently. Growth  in  agriculture  is  based  on  a  number  of  assumptions
pertaining   to   government   expenditures,    input    prices,    rainfall,    price    behaviour
(Swaminathan 2008). Trickle-down process of growth has been weak, since the growth is
not located in sectors where labour is concentrated (for example agriculture) and  also  in
states where poverty is concentrated (Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and UP).
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Notes
[?]         Klein (2005) concluded that “in recent years, we often approached such meetings with the thought
there was a main, sole locomotive for the world economy, but that situation has run its course, and the
motive power presently comes form China and India”.
2    See Business Week, “Stars of Asia”,11th July 2005, pp11
3    See in World Bank, World Development Indicators (CD-ROM, 2007)
4    The term “neoliberalism” is considered synonymous with “globalisation”. John Williamson (1994)
pronounced the concept as set of neoliberal policies, which in turn referred to the advice that was being
given by the Washington based International Financial Organisation namely IMF and World Bank to Latin
American countries during the late 1980s. These policies were: fiscal discipline, tax reforms, trade
liberalisation, privatisation of government enterprises, to liberalise financial sectors by reducing controls
over banking and greater role of FDI.
5              See International Trade Statistics, 2005, World Trade Organization, 2005, pp21, Table 1.5,
Geneva
6     According to China’s Statistical Yearbook (2004) that headcount poverty ratio declined drastically from
31 % in 1978 to 2.8 % in 2004 (Government of China), and in India ratio declined from about 60 % in
1950s to 23 % in 2003 and the most recent Planning Commission estimates suggest that poverty is
expected to decline further to 20 % by the end of 2008 (Planning Commission, New Delhi).
7     See Economic Survey, 2005, which is the annual publication of the Ministry of Finance, Government of
India, New Delhi.
8   See Dreze, J. and Sen, A. K. (eds) (1997) Indian Development: Selected Regional  Perspective,  Oxford
University Press: New Delhi
9    Until 1992, almost all FDI in China was in the form of joint ventures. The term ‘foreign invested’ was
used to reassure that these ventures were domestic firms with foreign participation. After 1992, a growing
proportion of local affiliates of foreign firms are majority owned or wholly owned by foreign investors.
10     The term ‘foreign invested enterprise’ covers subsidiaries of TNCs (Transnational Corporations) and
joint ventures. It is misnomer in China and here it means local affiliates of foreign owned firms. Many of
these locals are joint ventures with Chinese enterprise.
11    Wipro, an Indian based IT (information technology) firm, has a revenue is $ 1.7 billion and employees
42, 000 strong workforce in year 2004. Its stock, which is traded on Wall Street, has climbed 230 % in just
only two years. It has not only become leader in software development but also a pioneer in business-
process outsourcing.
12    For detail see John Gallagher and R. Robinson, (1953) “The Imperialism of Free Trade”, The
Economic History Review, Vol. 6. No.1, pp.1-15
13    See Ha-Joon Chang (2002) Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical
Perspective, Anthem Press: London
14    According to Dadabhai  Naoroji,  “India  had  since  the  late  18th  century  been  steadily  ‘bled’  of  its
industrial, agricultural and fiscal wealth, along several channels: enormous military expenses, import-export
imbalances  including  duties  on  British  goods,  debt  farming,  and   ‘Home   Charges’   in   the   form   of
developmental  loans  and  remittances  as  well  as  extremely  unfavourable  exchange  rate”.   (Dadabhai
Naoroji (1901: 283) Poverty and un-British Rule in India, Swan Sonnenshein and Co: London
15    The “drain theory” was developed by Dadabhai Naoroji in his book (1901) Poverty and un-British Rule
in India, Swan Sonnenshein and Co.: London. Others, too contributed to its theoretical development,
amongst them such as R.C. Dutt. They held the view that the cost to India of British colonialization was,
contrary to imperial rhetoric, to vast benefit of Britain and disadvantage to India.
16     For more recent debate on this issue, see Rama Dev Roy (1987) “Some Aspects of the Economic
Drain from India during the British Rule”, Social Scientist, Vol.15, No.3, March, pp.39-47)
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